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From the Ground Up: The Importance of Preserving SOF
Capacity Building Skills
Abstract
The last decade of international engagements marks a shift in the way that the American
military fights wars and mitigates conflict overseas. Although America has long had an
affinity for creative destruction and cycles of force buildup and tear down, it is increasingly
apparent that such an approach is not a viable option for the U.S. military’s path ahead.
After a decade of costly conflict with large conventional forces and an abundance of direct
action operations, the American way of war is evolving towards less muscle, more mind.
To this end, the specialized training, mentoring, and capacity building skills that Special
Operations Forces (SOF) receive must remain a priority in an era of fiscal austerity and
streamlined resources. It is easier to strengthen security forces than to strengthen
governance and the drivers that combat instability. As SOF returns to a focus on partner
capacity building programs rather than direct action missions, the lessons learned of the
last twelve years of international security assistance programs must be embraced and
codified rather than allowed to atrophy, as is often the case when the United States military
reorients its attention to new policy priorities. Reliance on external nations and allied
partners, coupled with the strategic direction to employ innovative, low-cost, and smallfootprint indirect approaches to prevent conflict, have made SOF a resource of choice for
both Combatant Commanders and military strategists.
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Introduction
The last decade of international engagements has illustrated a marked shift in the
way that the American military fights wars and mitigates conflict overseas. The
Department of Defense’s (DOD) activities in the coming years will continue to
build on these changes through a concerted emphasis on three pillars of
initiative. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) articulates these pillars
in a commitment to protecting the homeland, building security globally, and
projecting power and winning decisively.1
The second tenet of the QDR— building security globally, “in order to preserve
regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate
with others to address common security challenges”—is already guiding the
transition away from wide-scale conventional warfare and troop usage to more
targeted and nuanced special operations-type activities and training programs.2
The driving force behind this move to enable partner nations is that it is easier
and cheaper to augment an existing security force than it is to combat instability
and improve governance in a foreign land.
For much of its history, the broader DOD community had little interest in
security assistance activities, as they were regarded as neither a military mission,
nor as a contributor to national security. This perspective changed in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks as defense officials began regarding the defeat of terrorist threats
from the countries they emanate from as vital to U.S. national security. However,
the lack of United States capabilities in less commonly known languages and
dialects, cultural sensitivity, and country specialization culminated in the
realization that foreign military and security forces, centering around host nation
partnerships, would have to take the lead in conducting such activities, and
would likely need training from U.S. forces to do so.
While Special Operations Forces have long specialized in producing units that are
specifically dedicated to long-term “security force assistance” (SFA) efforts,
conventional service forces historically have not.3 Reliance on external nations
and allied partners, coupled with the strategic direction to employ innovative,
low-cost, and small-footprint indirect approaches to prevent conflict, have made
SOF a resource of choice for both Combatant Commanders and military
strategists. Along with the recent attention from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, SFA is “directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to
engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as “weak
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 2014),
V, available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
2 Ibid.
3 “The responsibility for conducting security force assistance has long resided with the special
operations community. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987,
and the U.S. Code (Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6, Section 167) identified foreign internal
defense (FID) as a special operations activity. The term “security force assistance” did not exist
when SOCOM was established. Nevertheless, “foreign internal defense” refers to activities that
support a host nation’s internal defense and development strategy and most closely mirror what is
considered SFA today”; Livingston, Thomas, Building the Capacity of Partner States Through
Security Force Assistance, CRS Report R41817 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, 2011): 31, available at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41817.pdf.
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or fragile states”) in a preventive national security strategy.”4 While all branches
of the military engage in security cooperation projects with foreign allies to some
extent, it is the SOCOM that is quickly gaining a monopoly on the game.

SOF in a Cyclical Context
Although America has long had an affinity for creative destruction and cycles of
force buildup and tear down, it is increasingly apparent that such an approach is
not a viable option for the U.S. military’s path ahead. Recent threat trends have
demonstrated that menaces to the American military and homeland are largely
the opposite of the Cold War mentality of State versus State, and it is now instead
smaller, non-state entities rather than large, nuclear ones who will be the most
common agitators.
After a decade of costly conflict with large conventional forces, the American way
of war is evolving towards less muscle, more mind. For all the advances made in
the Iraq war and reinforced by the American experience in Afghanistan, it could
easily be argued that the most important shift was that conventional forces
became more SOF-like. Conventional forces have historically provided the bulk
of the nation’s military powers through the major categories of land, naval,
aviation, and mobility forces. They consist of combat and support elements from
all branches of the military, “excluding all units dedicated to special operations
and nuclear deterrence.”5
Military Operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan led SOF to conduct more direct
action operations as the general purpose forces took over the security assistance
programs. This is a fundamental shift in responsibility for the conventional
forces, as special operational forces have historically specialized in enabling
partner nation foreign military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting
and military administration skills while mitigating destabilizing drivers of
conflict. Conventional forces, in turn, have largely been responsible for
supporting SOF in these missions with logistical support. During the wars of the
last decade, the superior tactical capabilities of many SOF units were called upon
to execute surgical strikes so heavily that the broader “train, advise, assist” (TAA)
tasks that were so necessary in building (or rebuilding) partner nation capacity
fell largely to conventional, general purpose forces.
As the intelligence community begins to refocus its efforts after the wars from
targeting and capture/kill missions to more classical intelligence functions, the
U.S. military’s SOF leadership is also seeing a public call to redirect their assets
from focused kinetic operations to the overarching traditions for which their
special training, operating, and advising skills were originally intended. These
traditions—in addition to hostage rescue and kinetic operations—include civil
affairs, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, preparation of the
environment, special reconnaissance, military information support, and other
unconventional warfare capabilities.6 SOCOM has also declared a current focus
4

Livingston, Building the Capacity of Partner States, 31.
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.:
OSD, 1999): Chapter 5, available at: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/chap5.htm.
6 USSOCOM Public Affairs, “U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 2014”, USSOCOM, 2014,
available at: www.socom.mil, 14.
5
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on expanding the global SOF partnership through strengthened regional
interaction and enterprise alignment to support the Special Operations network.7
Another example of the redirection of assets from direct action to training and
advising is that the surges of recent conflicts were about more than just putting
troops on the ground. Instead, these missions focused on a far more dramatic
intellectual shift towards understanding the human terrain. When delivering a
keynote address at 2013’s National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) symposium, SOCOM
Commander Admiral McRaven discussed the continued importance of this
approach when he assessed that, “Successful warfare depends on dominance of
the human domain.”8 This was supported by another SOF veteran at the
symposium who remarked, “It’s pretty obvious that we’re not going to kill our
way to victory, but there is going to be continued direct activity.” That direct
activity of a few elite units is largely a way to buy time to allow persistence in the
complementary indirect activities that the wider SOF community excels in.
The contrast between SOF specialties and the skills of conventional troops was
succinctly summed up by Dave Whitmire, CEO and President of contracting firm
K2 Solutions, Inc. and a decorated combat veteran with twenty-eight years of
Special Operations experience, when he explained, “SOF answers the essay
questions... conventional forces answer multiple choice questions.” SOF goes
beyond “who, what, where, and when”, and invests time and energy into
analyzing the “why”. With the context derived from that exercise combined with
a generally mature pedigree, SOF seeks to address the drivers of instability as
holistically as possible.9
DOD leadership recognizes the value of this carefully honed craft, and
recommended in the 2014 QDR that resources be allocated to, “grow overall SOF
end strength to 69,700 personnel” in an era when many personnel counts are
being pared down.10 Although SOF is not taking a direct hit in the current era of
fiscal austerity, all of the conventional force functions that support these
operations will have new constraints, and SOF will likely feel that. After all, the
oft-cited SOF Truth 5 is, “Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.”11
Improved technological surveillance and targeting capabilities have led to a
remarkable increase in targeting identification and direct action precision, but
what SOF troops receive explicit and intentional supplementary training for is the
human-level, on-the-ground interaction with local residents. The role that SOF
assets fulfill as trainers, for example, has existed for decades in regions where
stability requires augmented capabilities. Areas of instability are not
diminishing, though they are changing.
7

Ibid.
McRaven, William H. ADM, “Keynote Address: Persistent Engagement in the New Strategic
Environment,” National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., January 28-30, 2013.
9 According to a 2013 SOCOM demographic overview, the typical Special Operator is married and
has at least two kids, has 8 years’ experience in the General Purpose Force, and is an average of 29
years old for an enlisted serviceman, or 34 years old if serving as an officer. This operator has
attended multiple advanced tactical schools, is well educated, and is likely to hold a college degree.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 37.
11 USSOCOM, “SOF Truths,” SOCOM, available at: http://www.socom.mil/Pages/SOFTruths.aspx.
8
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According to a SOCOM announcement posted in March of 2014, countries of
interest for the U.S. military in the relatively near future include an “initial
dataset [of] Jordan, Djibouti, Burma, Honduras, Iran, Morocco, Nigeria, Trinidad
& Tobago, Burkina Faso, S. Sudan, N. Korea, and China (Guangdong).”12
Building on awareness of conditions in locales of interest such as these is
dependent on core SOF capabilities. As stated by the Acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of Defense, Honorable Michael
Lumpkin, during the NDIA’s 2014 gathering, “This approach is wholly consistent
with … routing terrorist networks wherever they arise. Such a model relies far less
on kicking in doors than building partner capacity, [and] this increased emphasis
on the indirect approach reflects the realities of our times.”13

Why Capacity Building?
The military has recognized the utility of applying aspects of a more
comprehensive and traditional development model to build host nation capacity,
and throughout the past decade—see the activities of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and outcomes of Commander’s Emergency Response Program—has
followed the lead of development groups in assessing the efficacy of using money
as their own non-kinetic weapons system to affect the change that they want to
see.14 This practice gained popularity in the last decade, during which time the
military embraced spending money to deter combatants from fighting by
investing in efforts that resulted in job creation, infrastructure investment,
increased educational attainment, and other stabilizers for broader human
security interests. In short, promoting development and stability has proven to
be a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.
Some might say that it is paradoxical to expect a soldier to do “non-soldiering’
work that crosses into development, but in reality these efforts are all stability
12 USSOCOM, “Statement of Work (SOW) USSOCOM Joint Intelligence Center Special Operations
Command (JICSOC) Geospatial Data on Countries of Interest for Which There is a Critical Need
But Non-Existent Data,” TIME, March 27, 2014, available at:
http://timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/fbo_revised_hgis_sow20mar14.pdf.
13 Lumpkin, Michael, “Keynote Address: Seamless SO/LIC: Government and Institutional
Partnerships, Supported by Industry, for Global Engagement,” National Defense Industrial
Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington,
D.C., February 10-12, 2014.
14 “A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to
operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to
improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness in
providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services”; Center for Army
Lessons Learned, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” United States Army Combined
Arms Center, September 2007, available at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/0734.pdf; “The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables local commanders in
Afghanistan and Iraq to respond with a nonlethal weapon to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian
relief, and reconstruction projects and services that immediately assist the indigenous population
and that the local population or government can sustain. The Department of Defense (DOD)
defines urgent as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that in the
judgment of the local commander calls for immediate action. Prior coordination with community
leaders increases goodwill. With most small-scale projects (less than $500 thousand [K]), CERP is a
quick and effective method that provides an immediate, positive impact on the local population
while other larger reconstruction projects are still getting off the ground”; Center for Army Lessons
Learned, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” United States Army Combined Arms
Center, February 15, 2014, available at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/ch-4.asp.
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operations whose doctrine has long been enshrined in U.S. military guidance.15
As per official doctrine, “The primary military contribution to stabilization is to
protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people
and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security.”16
While SOF are undeniably soldiers, their skill sets and missions tend to be more
holistic in that they are often integrated across disciplines and demonstrate an
understanding that the true success of their efforts will be based on the durability
of the gains that are made. An investment in partner national capacity building
now is a down payment against terrorist attacks and costly ground engagements
in the future, but capacity building is not just buying somebody a gun; it’s the
development of the underlying institutions, and the ability to make gains
sustainable.
If the U.S. military establishment can get partners to improve their governance
then there will be less physical space for maligned actors to operate in, or out of.
As one panelist on an NDIA panel addressing Special Operations LIC
partnerships stated
“[w]e’re pivoting away from the direct approach to rely much more
heavily on the indirect approach. The reason is, if the partner can close
even a portion of the undergoverned space… with his authorities… then
we are actually in a much better place than if we can close most of his
empty space for him but are then forced to leave.”17
In these undergoverned spaces, state presence throughout society is weak and the
majority of citizens may not recognize the state’s monopoly on the use of force.
In turn, legitimate state-affiliated institutions that fulfill the public’s expectations
fail to exist in these environments leading to difficulties in building a reputable
security force.18
Basic state functions that assert government authority, like border security,
become imperative as economies grow. Overland and maritime transit routes
that allow untaxed agricultural products also host gunrunners, drug smugglers,
and human traffickers. As Mr. James Roberts from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC once observed, “If you build a net of governance
it will catch all of your malign actors, or at least the great majority of them.”19
15 The Defense Technical Information Center provides the definition that, “Stability operations are
various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief.”
16 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07: Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 2011): 23, available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf.
17 Chatham House Rules, “Panel Presentation: SO/LIC Partnership Policies, Authorities, and
Strategies,” National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., February 10-12, 2014.
18 Whitney Grespin and Michael D. Rettig, “The Spaces in Between: Mitigating Threats in
Undergoverned Spaces,” The Small Wars Journal, October 17, 2013, available at
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-spaces-in-between-mitigating-threats-inundergoverned-spaces.
19 Roberts, James, “Panel Presentation: SOF and the Indirect Approach to Conflict Prevention,”
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., January 28-30, 2013.
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Resources and attention should be focused on key economic and transport hubs
that can determine whether actors will play local or global role. Reasons to
engage in illicit activities will always exist, but it is in the interest of threatened
states and the wider international community to ensure that ease of access is
restricted.20
Consistency of effort in capacity building programs starts with clearly defining an
end state that plainly illustrates what matters, and why. This very definition
dictates how to measure advancements and, most importantly, indicates what
can reasonably be considered ‘good enough.’ In many of the recent contexts that
the U.S. has tried to facilitate good governance, it should be kept in mind that
America had the luxury of confronting and resolving race, gender, and major
social issues over the course of decades, and the recent emergence of ‘occupy’
movements proves that even the American system is still in the midst of
addressing class issues.
Yet, there is often an expectation for emerging states to address all these
transitions in a few short years, combined with the ever present threat of
insecurity and war hanging over their heads on a daily basis. This reality needs to
be taken into account when considering what to classify as ‘good enough’ and
how SOF capacity building efforts may be complemented by other United States
Government (USG) assistance within partner nations.21 Such assistance
commonly takes the form of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) assistance, Department of State training and education
programs, or a myriad of other special interest efforts undertaken by various USG
entities.
Furthermore, the idea of a ‘good enough’ end state can’t be constructed from the
outside looking in. As Nobel Prize winning author Albert Camus wrote in The
Plague, “Perhaps the easiest way of making a town’s acquaintance is to ascertain
how the people in it work, how they love, and how they die.”22 Much of the
international community, as outsiders, has difficulty understanding that the roles
and the rules have governed our partner nations for decades, if not centuries.
Rear Admiral Brian Losey, Commander of Naval Special Warfare Command
(NAVSPECWARCOM), addressed the increased importance of cultural
competency training requirements through his assessment that, “If all you’re
going to show up with is a gun [then there are a lot of things] you’re missing…
Sensitizing our force to the idea that the population is important and bringing
something to that environment is important [for the human component].”23

20

Grespin and Rettig, “The Spaces in Between: Mitigating Threats in Undergoverned Spaces.”
"Capacity building is the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional
development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening
managerial systems"; Colonel Kenneth J. Crawford, “Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting
Conditions for Success,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 2011, available at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch_2.asp.
22 Camus, Albert, The Plague, trans. Stuart Gilbert (1948), available at:
http://evankozierachi.com/uploads/The_Plague_by_Albert_Camus.pdf.
23 Losey, Brian RDML, “Panel presentation: USSOCOM Component Commander Panel,” National
Defense Industrial Association’s Special Operations Forces Industry Conference (SOFIC), Tampa,
Florida, May 19-22, 2014.
21
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Focused TAA efforts are just as valuable tactically as they are strategically.
Former U.S. Army Green Beret Jim Bourie explained,
“The toppling of the Taliban by a handful of SFODA’s [Special Forces
Operational Detachment-Alpha, or the basic element/team of SF
operations] partnered with the Northern Alliance sent shockwaves
through the conventional military. Now [significant engagements] could
be won with 50 men and airpower.”24
This remarkable achievement clearly illustrated the strategic value of SOF forces,
and has encouraged increased integration of SOF skillsets into broader
operational planning across the spectrum of capacity building initiatives.25

Limitations
As Vice Admiral Bill Sullivan stated at a U.S. Global Leadership Coalition panel
held in Washington, D.C. in 2011, “Talk is cheap and it takes resources to get
something done.”26 Yet even after threatened budget cuts and the imminent
scaling back of support for SOF operations, Admiral McRaven observed in
February of 2014 at the 25th annual NDIA SO/LIC symposium that, “We’re 1.7
percent of the budget… for 1.7 percent you get a pretty good return on the
investment.”27 An investment in the training, advising, and mentoring
capabilities of SOF personnel is a force multiplier in terms of the outcomes of
subsequent programs that those personnel are expected to facilitate.
Linda Robinson, Senior International Policy Analyst at RAND, extrapolated on
this subject through her explanation that, “People [the taxpayer] have to
understand that they’re not buying into a welfare program for Country X. Once
you train the trainers, you are moving on.”28 By continuing to invest in SOF
capability to effectively and efficiently deliver training, the U.S. military is
ensuring that the students of SOF personnel become trainers themselves. This
multiplies the number of students who can be reached through the initial input
into “train the trainer” programs.
Funding to train and equip foreign military forces was broadly formalized and
augmented in 2006 through Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. This authorization, “provides the
Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for
two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign

24 As quoted in Whitney Grespin, “The Quiet Professionals: The Future of U.S. Special Operations
Forces,” The Diplomatic Courier September 20, 2013, available at
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/security/1803-the-quiet-professionals-thefuture-of-u-s-special-forces
25 Ibid.
26 Sullivan, Bill VADM, “Panel Presentation,” U.S. Global Leadership Coalition Conference,
Washington, D.C., July 12, 2011.
27 McRaven, “Keynote Address: Seamless SO/LIC.”
28 Robinson, Linda, “Panel Presentation: SO/LIC Partnership Policies, Authorities, and Strategies,”
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC) Symposium, Washington, D.C., February 10-12, 2014.
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security forces for counterterrorism operations.”29 Although Section 1206
authorization had been extended through FY2017—a credit to its importance in
an era of elastic priorities—the FY2014 NDAA further ensured the durability of
these efforts by expanding beyond the previous prescription that, “assistance for
counterterrorism (CT) purposes was limited to foreign military forces and nonmilitary maritime security forces,” and CT assistance now includes all types of
security forces.30 This swift reauthorization vastly increased the potential scope
of SOF skill application.
Beyond potential long-term financial limitations, the political risk and volatility
of public support for such missions are challenges that SOCOM must overcome
as it expands its international reach. The issue of vetting who to train both
institutionally and individually is a valid, and complex, issue. Stimson Center
analyst Russell Rumbaugh was recently quoted as pointedly observing about the
recipients of sensitive skill training that,
"Those guys, however, are not Americans. What happens when they take
their skills and do something we don't like, like kill priests, or run a
sectarian war, despite the efforts SOCOM is taking to avoid such
outcomes?... You can see the flaw baked in."31
This is an instance in which it would be highly informative to look at the lessons
learned from vetting and integration programs from the Afghan National Security
Force (ANSF) to ensure that the systems designed by SOF and other USG
capacity-building personnel are maintained in the years ahead, so as not to lose
the institutional ability to overcome such obstacles.
It must be recognized that this sort of assistance and security force capacity
building is inherently political in that it results in an intentional allocation of
resources that is determined by external stakeholders. For this reason, it is
essential that capacity building programs take into account what unintended
consequences may result from these types of capacity enhancing training
schemes. Evidence of this includes unsanctioned skills transfers from former
military personnel to foreign nationals on a one-to-one basis, and is visible up
through leadership levels such as in recent high-profile cases ranging from
foreign-supported Egyptian military leaders to the American-trained Malian coup
leaders.
Malian officer Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, for example, led a renegade
military faction to depose Mali’s democratically elected president in March of
2012 after having visited the U.S. repeatedly to receive professional military
education at the expense of the USG.32 This approach worked for Sanogo up until
29

Serafino, Nina, Security Assistance Reform: ‘Section 1206’ Background and Issues for Congress,
CRS Report RS22855 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
2014), available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf.
30 Ibid.
31 Sandra Erwin, “In Game of Strategy, SOCOM Outsmarting Conventional Military,” National
Defense, March 18, 2014, available at:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1447.
32 Craig Whitlock, “Leader of Mali military coup trained in U.S.,” Washington Post, March 23, 2012,
available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-23/world/35447186_1_amadou-hayasanogo-military-schools-malian.
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the coup at which time the U.S. denounced his actions and immediately cut off
the roughly $600,000 per year funding that had been allocated for Malian
military training.33 Furthermore, billions of dollars have been funneled to the
training and capacity building of the Egyptian military, both before and after
Mubarak’s fall from power.34 Two decades earlier another instance of abuse of
this training occurred when President Yahya Jammeh, after completing military
police training in Alabama in 1994, returned to his home in the Gambia to lead a
successful coup. He has been in power ever since.35
Even with persistent engagement and regular collaboration, these training
partnerships do need to be continuously evaluated to ascertain whether they
remain appropriate. It is important that security assistance partnering continues
and that policy does not become risk averse. This is especially true following
recent international incidents where the U.S. determined that skills derived from
security assistance training were misapplied against both civilians and
misconstrued adversaries.
Daniel Silverberg, former Deputy General Counsel for the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, speaking at the same SO/LIC conference as Admiral McRaven early
last year, summed up the challenge succinctly,
“Everyone is onboard that instability is a driver of terrorism, and in that
respect [insecurity] is a SOCOM mission. Instability is highly contextual…
whatever it is doesn’t lend itself to a uniform solution, [and] development
is political; you kind of end up picking winners or losers by who you give
resources to.”36
In short, it is easier to strengthen security forces than to strengthen governance
and the drivers that combat instability.
Representative Mac Thornberry, Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, agreed with Silverberg’s sentiment at the conference, “There are risks
to foreign military training, but we can’t do it all ourselves. We have to
understand and acknowledge that other entities may not do it as well as we do,
but maybe they just have to do it ‘good enough’.”37 Nearly a century after its
authoring, it is increasingly evident that T.E. Lawrence had it right when he
advised that host nations lead their own fights when he wrote in his Twenty
Seven Articles, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better [they] do
it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them,

33 Joshua Keating, “Trained in the U.S.A.,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2012, available at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/trained_in_the_usa?page=full.
34 John Norris, “Is American Training Too Many Foreign Armies?,” Foreign Policy, January 28,
2013, available at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/is_america_training_too_many_foreign_a
rmies?page=full.
35 Keating, “Trained in the U.S.A.”
36 Silverberg, Daniel, “Panel Presentation: Aligning USSOCOM’s Global SOF Development with
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not to win it for them.”38 It is critical that international forces remember that
they are there to train, advise, and assist efforts as is appropriate to the host
nation environment—not commandeer them in an effort to have those missions
mimic their own.

Conclusion: Looking Ahead
The international community’s experience after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
and as the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) continue their exits
from Afghanistan has taught them much in a short period of time. If there is a
lack of a functioning government that can provide a basic rule of law to its
citizens and a dearth of military capacity to protect that nation and its borders,
then in reality the international community is bequeathing that state with little
more than a military possessing an increased ability to abuse its people and take
advantage of its augmented abilities. The military needs to ensure that the
recipients of such training programs have a respect for the rule of law and the
concept of power sharing, rather than imparting sensitive skills to groups that
will merely sit and watch the hourglass, waiting to capitalize on the imminent
departure of the international community. As Major General Michael Repass of
Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) once stated, “No one nation can
do it all, but every nation can do something.”39
Given the prices that were paid to learn these lessons, it is vital that the
capabilities learned over the past decade do not deteriorate. Admiral McRaven
suggested that this sentiment extends beyond U.S. military opinion when he
addressed thousands of SOCOM supporters and said, “The American people do
not want to see a degradation of the Special Operations community.”40 As
Representative Mac Thornberry challenged a defense industry audience in
January of 2013,
“Are we incorporating the lessons learned over the past decade at a very
high price of blood and treasure into our training and into our doctrine, or
are we going to put it up on the shelf and say, ‘Hey if we need to get back
to that someday it’ll be there’?”41
Retaining this institutional knowledge and maintaining its applicability a variety
of international engagements is as much the responsibility of private industry
entities who are contracted to deliver training and SOF support services as it is of
its customer, the USG.
With Thornberry’s warning heeded, SOCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant
General John Mulholland issued a clear reminder via remarks in February 2014
that, “This isn’t new stuff... this has been our bread and butter since we first
existed… what is new is the coherence that we’re able to bring by virtue of
38
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[relationships].”42 Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH)
Commander, Brigadier General Sean Mulholland, echoed this sentiment as he
said, “Partner relationships are the heart of what we work to build every day.”43
Such consistent messaging goes beyond talking points for figureheads at public
events; it speaks to the truth of SOF priorities and preparations for the years
ahead. Admiral McRaven reinforced this approach yet again at the May 2014
NDIA Special Operations Forces Industry Conference when he explained, “The
global SOF network is not a thing; it’s a way of doing business.”44 These
partnerships and capacity building efforts are not one-off whims; they are
carefully considered, long-term engagements.
Given the expectations of what mission essential capabilities will be moving
forward with less attention on direct action and more effort put into
understanding and shaping the human domain, the importance of maintaining
intercultural communication skills and capacity building competencies will be
key in efforts that are designed to build partner capacity and mitigate the need for
future interventions. As SOF returns to a focus on facilitating partner capacity
building programs rather than undertaking frequent direct action missions to
promote national security interests, the lessons learned of the last dozen years of
international security assistance programs must be embraced and codified rather
than allowed to atrophy. Reliance on State-to-State partnerships and the
network of global special operations forces, coupled with official guidance to
apply resourceful approaches to prevent instability and grow global security,
necessitate that institutional capacity carefully accumulated and curated over the
past decade does not wither.
The ability to instill democratic values in underdeveloped societies, facilitate
close training of allied militaries, conduct persuasive military intelligence support
operations, or impose a semblance of order in a foreign society fragmented by
internal conflicts or ravaged by systemic insecurity: none of these are easy tasks,
but they are necessary. The ongoing need for these specialized skills highlights
why it is appropriate to preserve the unique abilities the U.S. Special Operations
Forces, and demonstrates that making a small investment in the strength of
partner foreign security forces now can save blood and treasure down the line.
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